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Abstract 
This research inquired into whether government structure has any influence on 
expenditure. On the national sample of U.S. county governments several hypotheses were 
tested. To estimate the influence of structure on expenditure, a linear regression analysis 
was used.  The findings suggest that government structure does have an impact on 
agencies’ expenditure levels. Specifically, findings indicate that traditional Commission 
structure tends to spend the least, followed by Commission-mayor and the most 
expensive being Commission-manager. 
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Introduction 
 U.S. county government’s area is a fertile ground for research, but has not 
garnered the attention states, cities, and the federal government has. The majority of 
current literature has analyzed city government reform and its consequences, leaving out 
county governments. Since counties are major service providers, changing their structure 
may have a considerable impact on various aspect of its governance such as policy 
decisions, expenditure levels, and service delivery among others (Marando and Reeves, 
41).   
Using a national sample of counties, this research focuses on whether changing 
county government structure will have any impact on its expenditure levels. It will be 
argued that altering county governmental structure will influence county expenditure 
levels. The structural arrangement of political actors provides a framework of constraints 
and incentives, which in turn gets reflected on expenditure. Specifically, it will be argued 
that changing traditional commission style government structure to commission-manager, 
commission-administrator, or commission mayor will increase expenditures.  
Institutional Background 
 Historical development of county governments varied in different parts of the 
country due to diverse views and desires of colonial settlers. In New England, counties 
mostly performed judicial functions while cities provided governing along with economic 
and security services (NACo 2009, 6).  Counties in New York and Pennsylvania 
developed political authority while in Virginia they established themselves as dominant 
local government entities (NACo 2009, 6). In general, however, the role of counties was 
primarily seen as an “arm of state government,” thus only exercising the authority that 
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was given to them by state governments. This notion was supported in 1868 Iowa 
Supreme Court case Clinton vs. Cedar Rapids and the Missouri River Railroad. Justice 
Dillon opined that “Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers 
and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without 
which they cannot exist. As it creates, so may it destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge 
and control” (24 Iowa 455; 1868). This became known as Dillon’s Rule. 
In 1871, Chief Justice Coley of the Michigan Supreme court in People vs. Hurlbut 
opined that local governments have an  inherent right to self-determination (24 Mich. 44, 
108; 1871). This sparked an opposing view to Dillon’s Rule, requiring flexibility in self-
determination. In 1940s and 1950s in an attempt to provide more and improved services 
county reforms and structural changes started taking place (NACo 2009, 6). Reform 
movement resulted in many counties nationwide adopting home rule, altering their 
structure and increasing their service provisions.  
 Traditionally, most counties had a commission form of governing structure. The 
commission usually consisted of three to five commissioners who were elected from 
single member districts or at-large elections (NACo 2009, 7). The commissioners were 
given both legislative and executive powers to manage counties. The lack of a single 
executive and aggregation of power in commissions have been the major criticisms of 
county government structure. 
 The adoption of home rule allowed counties to gain wider authority of self-
determination in structural, functional and fiscal areas (NACo 2009, 7) Structurally 
counties altered themselves by either creating a chief executive position appointed by 
commission (hereinafter commission-manager) or at-large elected executive (hereinafter 
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commission-mayor). The latter completely separates executive and legislative powers and 
usually possesses veto power.   
 Functional changes were mostly adopted in the name of attempting to meet the 
growing demands of service needs. Home rule counties were no longer required to seek 
approval from the state government while providing services that were not mandated by 
the state such as libraries, parks and recreation, cultural affairs and others. Other 
functional changes usually included flexibility in regards to agreements with neighboring 
local governments consolidating some of the services, thus utilizing economies of scale 
(NACo 2009, 8).  
In the fiscal area counties that adopted home rule were given authority to raise 
revenues through several means. Taxing authority varied widely as to areas where tax is 
allowed to be levied and the percent. Another source of revenue was allowance of issuing 
bonds. These were generally used for the construction of public facilities such as parks 
and libraries. Counties were also given authority to charge user fees for delivering 
specific services to certain geographic areas or groups (NACo 2009, 8). 
Literature Review 
Majority of research analyzing relationship of government structure and 
expenditures focused on cities and municipalities. However, there is a small number of 
empirical works conducted specifically on counties. Bradbury and Stephenson (2003) 
focused on whether “Law of 1/n” held true for county governments. “Law of 1/n" states 
that there is a positive correlation between the number of elected district representatives 
in legislature and government spending (Bradbury and Stephenson 2003, 187).  
Representatives (commissioners) allocate spending from common tax base bear part of 
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total cost. Thus, as the number of districts increase the cost born by each district becomes 
smaller, this in turn leads to larger projects being approved (MacDonald 2008, 460).  On 
the sample of 154 counties of Georgia the authors found that the number of 
commissioners is positively correlated with county government expenditures, which 
provided support that the theory holds true on local level. The findings suggested that 
adding an extra commissioner, regardless of the size of the commission, led to 4.4 
percent increase in total expenditure per capita and 5 percent increase in net expenditure. 
In dollar terms it would be $41.23 per capita of total expenditure and $43.39 per capita of 
net expenditure. The authors also found that the relationship holds true for the following 
budget components: welfare, health, hospital expenditures, natural resource and sewage. 
The positive relationship was not found for highway spending. 
Morgan and Kickman (1999) studied whether changing county government 
structure from traditional commission to a commission-mayor or a commission-manager 
had any effects on revenue and expenditures. Their findings indicated that changes in 
government structure for counties had no effect on fiscal behavior. Another finding was 
that intergovernmental revenue was positively correlated with both reformed and 
unreformed county structures, thus supporting that grants-in-aid stimulate additional 
spending. For unreformed (commission) government structure coefficient was .36, which 
means for every 1 percent increase intergovernmental revenue county government 
expenditure increases by .36 percent each year. In addition, the coefficients for 
unreformed counties for intergovernmental revenue were higher, which the authors 
interpreted as reformed counties being less dependent on aid money.  As for regions, 
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Middle Atlantic region reformed counties received more money and had higher 
expenditure; the authors were not sure how to interpret these findings. 
 Benton (2003) analyzed whether changing county government form had any 
impact on their ability to raise revenue. A sample of Florida counties showed that 
adopting home rule charter (changing government to commission-mayor or commission 
manager) had significant effects on the ability to raise revenue. The author suggested that 
a change in government structure gives counties more flexibility from state government 
thus allowing them to raise more revenue in contrast to traditional commission counties. 
In addition, the author found that while population was significant, the adoption of a 
home rule was a better predictor of sales tax revenue.  
Campbell and Turnbull (2003) looked into whether there was a difference in 
expenditure levels between elected official and professional manager in counties and 
municipalities. The authors found that government structure, both for municipalities and 
counties had no significant effect on their spending. The authors also suggested that this 
could be due to the trade-offs between managerial proficiency and principle agent effects 
of professional rather than elected management.  
 Morgan and Pelissero (1980) analyzed whether reformed cities (with manager, at-
large election and non-partisan ballots) taxed and spent less than unreformed ones. To 
measure that effect authors used a quasi-experimental time-series design. They found that 
reformed cities had little to no effect in the long run on the basic fiscal decisions. Thus, 
based on these findings they claimed that reforming government structure of a city would 
not decrease taxing and spending in the long run. 
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Deno and Mehay (1987) inquired whether a council-manager form of city 
government is more efficient than mayor-council. Their findings indicated that there are 
no significant differences between these two forms of government. The findings support 
the hypothesis that the median voter was the decisive determinant in budget 
determination. The authors also found that lower wage rates in mayor-council cities were 
offset by higher fringe benefits in those cities, thus revealing no difference in total labor 
compensation. 
 Zax (1989) looked into whether citizen initiative influenced local public 
expenditures and found that government expenditures per capita are significantly higher 
in both states and municipalities in which citizen initiative was present. On the state level, 
initiative increased direct state expenditures per capita by approximately $265.  As for 
municipalities, initiative increased direct expenditures per capita by $45. The author also 
found that expenditures increased significantly with the increase of percent of population 
proportions in rental units. On state level 1% increase of population proportion in rental 
units  led to 28.8% increase in expenditures while on municipality level 1% change of 
population proportion led to  6.67% increase in expenditures. 
 Farnham (1990) examined whether direct citizen influence- the initiative, 
referendum, and recall-had any effects on level of local public expenditure. A national 
sample of 735 cities with population of 10,000 or more people was used for the study. 
Author divided the sample into three categories according to the number of direct 
democracy elements. Earlier studies (Pom-merehne 1978) suggested that the size of the 
income and tax price elasticities should increase as the number of direct democracy 
elements increased. However, the findings in this study did not reveal any pattern 
7 
 
   
 
regarding the estimated income and tax-price elasticities. The largest elasticities were 
found in communities with only one direct democracy element, which was typically the 
initiative. For the second regression author used the entire sample in which only 
referendum had significant effect on expenditure but the effect was positive, not negative 
as hypothesized.  For the third regression author divided the sample by geographic 
regions, since the usage of democracy elements varied by geographic region along with 
the expenditure levels. The results were that initiative had significantly negative effect on 
expenditure in western communities while recall had significantly negative effect in the 
northeast. Despite these findings author reported that overall influence of the direct 
democracy elements on expenditures was not strong even in homogeneous geographic 
areas. The coefficients of the council-manager or commission government and at large 
council variables were not significant in any of the equations.  
 Sass (1991) constructed a model of municipal government choice (treated as 
endogenous) between representative and direct democracy. His findings suggested that 
government structure (when endogenous) did not affect school expenditure levels. 
However, opposite was true when government structure was treated as exogenous. Per 
capita school expenditures were sufficiently lower in representative democracies than 
direct democracies.  For non-educational expenditures, however, both models suggested 
that municipal expenditures were not significantly affected by the government structure. 
 Reid (1991) explored whether institutional or non-institutional factors had 
stronger effect on local public expenditure decisions. The results of the study revealed 
that local public expenditure decisions reflected the distribution of voter demands 
regardless of the institution of governance. Both the median and the mean of voter’s 
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expenditure demands tracked actual expenditure decisions well, holding everything else 
constant. Government structures, on the other hand, did not reveal any important 
independent effects upon collective expenditure decisions. Thus, the author suggested 
based on this sample of the study that in order to manage public expenditure altering 
government structure, the method of selecting elected officials and management was not 
sufficient. 
 As for elections, Southwick (1997) considered the effects on expenditure of at-
large elections versus district representation on a sample of 1812 cities with population of 
10,000 or more residents. The author found that expenditures, debt, and taxes were 
significantly and substantially higher in cities with district representation than in cities 
with at-large representation. In addition, several demographic variables were significant. 
The percentage of owner occupancy and percentage of white population were significant 
factors reducing expenditures, while education and initiative increased the level of 
expenditures. 
 Baqir (2002) inquired into whether the number of commissioners impacted city 
expenditures. Findings indicated that government size did increase with the number of 
commission members in a city government. In addition, the author found that government 
size increased with the racial heterogeneity of the city and in cases when income 
distribution is skewed. Further the author looked into the question whether the correlation 
between the number of council members and government size could be influenced by 
elections at-large or by a strong mayor (with veto power). Author found that election at-
large had no effect while strong mayor was able to break the correlation between the 
number of commissioners and larger expenditures. 
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 MacDonald (2008) examined whether form of government, size of the city 
commission, and election method of commissioners had any impact on expenditure 
levels. Author suggested that earlier studies may have had been subject to omitted 
variables bias due to the use of cross sectional estimation. The findings from cross-
sectional estimation for the study did in fact show a positive correlation between 
commission size and expenditures however once fixed effect estimation was used the 
relationship became insignificant. Author suggested that the findings indicate that 
logrolling was not present or insignificant when it came to city governments.    
Coate and Knight (2010) analyzed which form of city government, mayor-council 
or manager council, had less expenditure.  According to the fiscal policy determination 
theory government spending should be less in the mayor-council form of government 
(Coate and Knight 2010, 20). The authors incorporated cross-sectional and panel analysis 
to test the hypothesis, and their findings support theoretical expectation: mayor-council 
cities had significantly less government spending.  Their findings using panel analysis 
suggested that per-capita spending was approximately 9% lower in cities with mayor-
council form of government. 
 In general, current literature reports mixed results on impact of government 
structure on expenditure levels. This study will contribute to the literature in several 
ways. First, the question of whether government structure has any impact on expenditure 
levels will be analyzed on the largest sample of county governments. Second, analyzing 
the matter on a more homogenous data may reveal different results than previous studies. 
In addition, having three datasets with five year intervals will ensure robustness of 
findings.     
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Theoretical Model 
Origins of the nation state and the role of government have been one of the most 
theoretically debated topics among and within disciplines. One of the well understood 
theories of the state is the theory of public good (Hardin 1997, 21). Theory suggests that, 
first, an individual has an incentive to join the collective action in order to increase 
his/her own utility since it has more potential to eliminate some of the external costs and 
secure some of the external benefits.  Second, an individual has no incentive to bear the 
costs of creating a good (public good) that would also be enjoyed by the public (other 
individuals). Thus, it has been presumed that people intentionally created 
state/government in order to ensure the above mentioned.  The creation of government 
also imposes costs on public, thus taxes are collected as a form of a payment for the 
goods and services provided by the government.  
On the other hand, Samuelson differentiated two goods “private consumption 
goods – X1, X2, …, Xn”  and “collective consumption goods:  Xn+1, Xn+2, …, Xn+m” (i.e. 
pure public goods)., where X is a good. Pure public good was defined by Samuelson as 
“collective consumption goods which all enjoy in common in the sense that each 
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other 
individual's consumption of that good” (Samuelson 1954, 387) This characteristic 
became known as non-rivalry. Another characteristic of pure public good is the non-
excludability which postulates that an individual or a group cannot be excluded from 
consuming the good.    
Public goods provided by local governments should be differentiated from pure 
public goods since they possess characteristic of “privateness” (Stiglitz 1982, 3). In other 
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words, the beneficiaries of local public goods are only the people who belong to that 
community not the whole society. 
1
 In addition, unlike a public good that is provided 
nationally in which people do not have a choice to opt out from tax, with local public 
goods people have an option of locating themselves into areas that meet their preferences.  
Tiebout’s model of local public good states that each individual, just as in the 
private market of goods, would be seeking to get to the highest level of indifference 
subject to a given price and tax by locating themselves in a community of their 
preference (Tiebout 1956, 418). Thus, various communities are competing for residents 
just as private companies compete for customers. The author argues that this competition 
leads to efficient allocation of public goods.   
Stiglitz’s model on the other hand argues that when it comes to local public goods 
individuals are utility takers, thus locating or relocating of one individual from one 
community to another does not have an influence on the price or quantity of local public 
good provided by municipalities. The model disputes Tiebout’s argument of local public 
goods being Pareto efficient. Stiglitz points out that Tiebout’s model does not address the 
three recognized problems associated with the delivery of public goods. First is the 
revelation problem which states that unlike in private market where preferences are 
registered by direct purchase of goods in public goods market, due to taxes, individuals 
have incentive not to reveal their true needs. Second is the social choice problem 
establishes that there is no “social choice mechanism satisfying the commonly accepted 
desiderata of (i) non-dictatorship; (ii) transitivity; (iii) independence of irrelevant 
alternatives; and (iv) Pareto optimality”. The third is management of public good which is 
                                                          
1
 This assumes that people cannot belong to several communities or use amenities in their neighboring 
communities. In addition, it assumes that there are no “spill-over” effects.   
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that citizens do not have incentive to gather information while selecting their public 
managers and that the latter’s incentive to provide the public good is “absent or far from 
perfect” (Stiglitz 1982,1). This stems from the self-interest axiom stating that an 
individual is primarily interested in furthering his/her own goals and only after that 
providing benefit to others. Thus, for elected officials their interest would be remaining in 
the office.      
Downs (1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1962) along with Niskanen (1971) 
proposed that government should not be perceived as an entity that attempts to maximize 
the welfare function for society but rather analyze its components separately. 
Bureaucrats, voters, businesses and legislators face different sets of constraints and 
incentives which as a result impacts the overall decision making process of government. 
The structural arrangement of political actors provides a framework of constraints and 
incentives. Thus, what should be examined is the influence of differing political 
institutional structure on political outcome.  
In a traditional commission structure if members are elected from single member 
districts, they are incentivized to return expenditures to their respective districts. 
Weingast, et.al (1981) formalized that representatives (commissioners) who allocate 
spending from a common tax base only bear part of the cost, thus as the number of 
representatives increase so does the spending. The cost born by each district becomes 
smaller as the number of districts increases thus leading to larger projects being approved 
(MacDonald 2008, 460). The relationship is known as the “Law of 1/n”.  
If commissioners are elected at large though, their incentive to pander to the 
interests of certain district gets muted to a certain level. Commissioners may still favor 
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certain districts and/or groups. However, such behavior is less likely to occur since it may 
result in alienation of other districts and/or groups within a county.  
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argued that political actors will realize that 
“collective choices are not unique and isolated events. As rational participants, individual 
commissioners will recognize the time sequence of political choices which in turn will 
cause them to seek ‘gains from trade’ when possible” (121). Commissioners will trade 
their votes among each other in order to pass their legislation. Commonly known as 
“logrolling” it is likely to take place regardless whether commissioners are elected at 
large or from single member districts. This may have a stronger effect on determining the 
influence of commission size on expenditure, since as the number of commissioners 
increase, logrolling becomes inevitable in order to get projects approved (MacDonald 
2008, 460). This, in turn will lead to more projects being approved thus raising overall 
expenditure. Thus, it can be hypothesized that as the number of commissioners increase 
so would the expenditures of a county. 
Deno and Mehay (1987, 628) argued that in a commission-manager structure, 
political pressures faced by commissioners are conveyed to an appointed manager. Thus, 
appointing a manager does not change political spectrum, which could potentially ensure 
that spending is close to the needs of the median voter (Deno and Mehay 1987, 628). As 
for managers’ incentives, they are contingent on whether commissioners reward him/her 
for cost-minimizing behavior (629). However, managers prospects depend upon the size 
of the budget and employees managed, thus he/she is incentivized to increase the budget 
of the entity. In addition, counties that go through structural changes also secure wider 
fiscal authority, which allows them to raise revenue. Thus, theoretically it could be 
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expected that the expenditures for this structure would be higher than expenditures from a 
traditional commission.    
In a commission-mayor structure, the fact that mayors face re-election provides an 
incentive to pay closer attention to the needs of voters. In addition, in counties where 
commissioners are elected by single member districts, mayors provide a counter-balance 
to the commissioners’ incentive of the Law of 1/n. As for logrolling though, this structure 
does not seem to provide any mechanisms to influence the behavior. In fact the mayor 
will most likely utilize it in order to gain support for his/her project(s). The availability of 
direct citizen influence tools such as initiative, referendum, and recall should have an 
adverse effect on this behavior, since elected officials will realize that too much 
logrolling might cost them their seat. As for expenditures, counties that adopt this 
structure also attain wider fiscal authority, which gives them more flexibility when it 
comes to raising revenue. Thus, when it comes to expenditure it can be hypothesized that 
for this government structure it will be higher than the commission structure, since the 
mayor will seek county-wide projects and utilize fiscal flexibility, which will increase 
expenditure.  
The theoretical expectation of expenditure comparisons between commission-
mayor and commission manager is mixed. Booms (1966, 188) argued that managers, 
being professionally trained in public management and appointed instead of elected, are 
isolated from special interest lobbying which in turn should result in lower expenditures. 
However, Coate and Knight (2010, 18) argued that it is the elected executive who would 
have adverse impact on expenditures due to separation of powers and political 
competition, which would keep both entities in check. 
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Based on the information provided above the following hypotheses are to be 
tested. 
H1: County government expenditure for traditional commission structure will 
increase with increase of the number of commissioners. 
H2: County government expenditure will be higher for commission-manager 
structure than for traditional commission structure. 
H3: County government expenditure will be higher for commission-mayor 
structure than for traditional commission structure.  
Data 
The data for the study was attained from the International City/County Management 
Association’s Form of Government surveys for 1997, 2002 and 2007 years. The survey 
collects data on the structure of county governments, election systems, provisions for 
referendum or recall, term limits, and the powers and authority of the county 
manager/mayor and commission. It is conducted every five years and is mailed directly to 
county clerks. For the year of 1997 it was sent to 3,052 counties, out of those 1,069 
counties (35%) responded to the survey. For the year of 2002 the survey was sent to 
3,046 counties out of which total, 992 counties (32.6%) responded to the survey. As for 
the year 2007 the survey was sent to 3,039 counties out of which 1,102 counties (36.3%) 
responded to the survey. The data is perhaps the most recent and comprehensive datasets 
available on the subject. The demographic and expenditure data for corresponding years 
for each county were obtained from U.S. Census Berea’s Historical Finances of 
Individual Governments: Fiscal Years 1967 and 1970 - 2007 database. It contains over 
500 variables on government revenues, expenditure, debt, cash and security holdings. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Mean Expenditure (in thousands of dollars $000)  
1997 2002 2007 
Government form variable 
Commission $21,181.03 $18,903.85 $33,410.15 
Commission-
administrator $133,976.1 $67,335.97 $127,412.7 
Commission-manager N/A $178,287.3 $254,126.3 
Commission-mayor $86,855.6 $111,564.5 $140,166 
Direct citizen influence variable 
Initiative $31,029.13 $19,411.6 $45,929.76 
Legislative referendum N/A N/A $126,593.5 
Popular referendum N/A N/A $85,070.39 
Binding referendum $63,542.47 $56,774.28 N/A 
 
 In all three datasets the mean expenditures for different forms of government 
structure vary considerably. As it was hypothesized Commission form of county 
government has the lowest mean expenditure, while Commission-manager has the 
highest. It is worth noting that the mean expenditure for Commission-administrator for 
2002 is nearly half of what it is for 1997. Among all government forms the Commission-
manager has the largest increase in Expenditure ($75,839), followed by Commission-
administrator ($60,077) from 2002 to 2007 years. As for direct citizen influence 
variables, the mean Expenditure for counties which allow several elements has the 
highest mean, while the lowest mean Expenditure belongs to Initiative and Recall.  
Empirical Model and Methodology 
To estimate the influence of county government structure on expenditure, a linear 
regression of the following form was used: 
Non-binding referendum $53,670.36 $104,037.8 N/A 
Recall $41,669.88 $43,530.24 $49,238.26 
Petition/protest 
referendum $94,657.57 $51,785.97 N/A 
Combination of several $90,218.33 $98,258.25 $140,612.4 
17 
 
   
 
ln (Expenditure) = β0+ β1 (ln (population)) +β2(government form)+ β3 (ln 
(intergovernmental revenue)) + β4 (veto power) + β5 (commission size)  + β6 
(commission election method) + β7 (direct citizen influence)+ε 
 
In this, equation the dependent variable is natural logarithm total county 
expenditure without payments on interest for 1997, 2002 and 2007. The independent 
variables are: natural logarithm population (continuous); three county government forms 
for 1997: (0) other forms, (1) commission (dummy), (2) commission-administrator 
(dummy), (3) commission-mayor (dummy), and four forms for 2002 and 2007: (1) 
commission (dummy), (2) commission-administrator (dummy), (3) commission-manager 
(dummy), and (4) commission-mayor (dummy); natural logarithm total 
intergovernmental revenue (continuous);  veto power (dummy variable); commission size 
(continuous); two categories of commission election method for 1997: (1) at large and (2) 
by ward/district and three categories for 2002 and 2007: (1) at large, (2) by ward/district 
(categorical) and (3) combined (categorical); six direct citizen influence tools for 1997 
and 2002: (1) initiative (dummy), (2) binding referendum (dummy), (3) non-binding 
referendum (dummy), (4) recall (dummy), (5) petition/protest referendum (dummy), (6) 
combination of several (dummy), and five for 2007:  (1) initiative (dummy), (2) 
legislative referendum (dummy), (3) popular referendum (dummy), (4) recall (dummy), 
(5) combination of several (dummy).  
All estimated models included seven variables, three of which are continuous and 
four are categorical.  Categorical variables were recoded and (m-1) independent columns 
were created for each, where m is the number of categories in each variable. Residuals 
and variables of this model were examined to check the assumptions of normality, 
linearity, and homoscedasticity. Upon checking the normality assumption by kernel 
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density, “Q-Q” and “Normal Probability” plots it was suspected that residuals were not 
normally distributed and transformation of the response variable is needed.  Because the 
response variable takes only positive values, may be skewed, and the ratio of the 
minimum value to the maximum value of the dependent variable is large natural 
logarithm transformation was applied.  After the transformation the above mentioned 
plots were generated and they did not suggest any severe violation of normality 
assumption (i.e. residuals are approximately normally distributed). 
Independent variables were also checked for linearity by the aid of scatter plots of 
response variable against predictors and augmented partial residual plots.  These plots 
suggested logarithmic transformations for Population and Intergovernmental revenue 
variables. Once transformed, augmented partial residual plots were made and they did not 
suggest severe violations of linearity assumption. It is also worth noting that once 
Population and Intergovernmental revenue variables were corrected for linearity via 
transformation. 
To check the homoscedasticity of residuals, the residual plot was created prior to 
all transformations, which revealed heteroscedasticity of residuals for all three models. 
Once natural logarithm transformation to the outcome variable as well as the two above 
mentioned continuous variables was employed the residual plot revealed that constant 
variance assumption after transformation is not severely violated. 
Regression Results and Discussion 
 
According to the findings of regression analysis for year of 1997, 10% increase in 
Population variable will lead to approximately 4% increase in Expenditure, significant at 
P-value < 0.01.  As for government structure variables, changing the structure from 
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Commission to Commission-administrator will lead to 23.90% increase in Expenditure, 
significant at P-value < 0.01. The coefficient for Commission-mayor variable is negative, 
however it is not statistically significant.  As for Intergovernmental revenue, 10% 
increase will lead to approximately 4.6% increase in Expenditure, significant at P-value  
< 0.01. The Veto power and Commission size are statistically insignificant for this 
dataset. As for election method variables changing from district/ward election the 
combination of both methods will lead to 21.39% increase in Expenditure, P-value < 
0.01.  Among the direct citizen influence all variables for the 1997 dataset have positive 
coefficients, however none are statistically significant in this dataset.   
For year of 2002 findings of regression analysis indicate that 10% increase in 
Population variable will lead to approximately 4.6% increase in Expenditure, significant 
at P-value < 0.01. As for government structure variables, this year’s data captured the 
effects of an administrator and a manager. The coefficient of Commission-administrator 
is positive however is statistically insignificant in this dataset. Changing the structure 
from Commission to Commission-manager will lead to 19.11% increase in Expenditure, 
significant at P-value < 0.01. As for changing the form from Commission to 
Commission-mayor will lead to 17.31% increase in Expenditure, significant at P-value < 
0.05. Ten percent increase in Intergovernmental revenue variable will lead to 4.2% 
increase in Expenditure, significant at P-value < 0.01. The availability of Veto power and 
Commission size are statistically insignificant in this dataset.  Election method variables 
indicate that changing from district/ward election to Combined elections will lead to 
17.38% increase in Expenditure, significant at P-value < 0.05. As for Direct citizen 
influence elements several are statistically significant. Findings indicate that allowing 
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Recall versus Initiative will lead to 33.55% increase in Expenditure significant at P-value 
< 0.05. In addition, allowing Petition/protest referendum versus Initiative will lead to 
28.22% increase in Expenditure significant at P-value < 0.010. However, data shows that 
the largest increase, 42.97% significant at P-value < 0.01, in Expenditure is led by 
counties that allow combination of several Direct citizen influence variables versus 
Initiative.   
The findings of regression analysis for year of 2007 indicate that 10% increase in 
Population variable will lead to approximately 5.2% increase in Expenditure, significant 
at P-value < 0.01. As for government structure changing the structure from Commission 
to Commission-administrator will lead to 19.63% increase in Expenditure, significant at 
P-value < 0.01. In addition changing from Commission to Commission-manager will lead 
to 35.40% increase in Expenditure, significant at P-value < 0.01. As for changing the 
structure from Commission to Commission-mayor will lead to 12.87% increase in 
Expenditure, significant at P-value < 0.05. Ten percent increase in Intergovernmental 
revenue variable will lead to approximately 3.7% increase in Expenditure, significant at 
P-value < 0.01. The possession of Veto power and Commission size are statistically 
insignificant in this dataset. As for election method variables both are statistically 
insignificant in this dataset as well. From the Direct citizen influence elements allowing 
Popular referendum versus Initiative will lead to 20.00% increase in Expenditure, 
significant at P-value < 0.010. In addition allowing Recall versus Initiative will lead to 
39.85% increase in Expenditure while allowing combination of several Direct citizen 
influence variables versus Initiative will lead to 28.93% increase in Expenditure, both 
significant at P-value < 0.01.  
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From a theoretical perspective the fact that population is explanatory of the 
outcome variable is quite expected. The finding is suggesting that growth in population 
will result in increase of county government expenditure, which is expected. What should 
be noted though is the capacity of existing services to absorb population increases up to a 
certain level. In all three years findings indicate that counties have the ability to 
accommodate approximately about 5% increase in the population without increasing their 
expenditures.   
Intergovernmental revenue variable was included in order to capture the effect of 
exogenous funding. Findings do support the theory that grants-in-aid increase local 
government spending (Courant, Gramlich, Rubinfeld 1979, 6). However, the magnitude 
of the effect was much smaller than expected. The limitation of the finding is that the 
data does not specify whether the grants were matched or not.     
As for government structure variables the findings do support the theoretical 
expectations that hiring a manager (administrator for 1997 data) does not decrease the 
cost of government. Instead, the incentives faced by managers seem to be driving the 
Expenditures considerably higher for the given sample of counties in all three years. In 
addition, counties that adopt structural changes also secure wider fiscal authority which 
allows more flexibility when it comes to raising revenues. Another possible explanation 
of the finding is that managers, due to their professional training, are more likely to be 
successful in obtaining exogenous funding from state and federal sources, which in turn 
is effecting the expenditure. Nevertheless, data indicated that 10% of exogenous funding 
only stimulate about 4% increase in Expenditure in all three datasets.    
22 
 
   
 
In addition, these findings provide support that changing county government 
structure from Commission to Commission-mayor would also increase the Expenditure. 
Similarly wider fiscal authority, which allows flexibility in raising revenue, is most likely 
being utilized under this structure as well. One possible explanation for this finding could 
be that county mayors may be seeking larger county wide projects due to increased 
revenues.  
Comparing the impacts of Commission-manager and Commission-mayor on 
expenditure reveals that for 1997 dataset they are quite similar, which is increasing it by 
19.11% and 17.31% respectively. However, for 2007 dataset Commission-manager 
increased the expenditure by over 35% while Commission-mayor increased it by nearly 
13%. These findings surely suggest that by changing the county government structure 
from Commission to other forms will not lead to lower expenditures. However, if citizens 
demand modernization or change then Commission-mayor, according to these findings, is 
a better fit for county governments.  
 The results also suggest that allowing direct citizen influence elements on county 
level, specifically Recall, Petition/protest referendum and Combination of several are also 
increasing the Expenditure with respect to Initiative. Possible explanation of this finding 
is that commissioners along with managers/mayors are more careful in their governing 
procedures. This in turn may be increasing the cost of projects and procedures they 
engage in.     
 This study has several limitations, some of which are omitted variable bias and 
endogeneity. Theory suggests including additional factors that may influence local 
government spending. The first factor is ratio of homeowner and renters. This factor may 
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influence local government expenditure because homeowners will likely vote for less 
expenditure in order to lower their taxes while renters will likely do the opposite in order 
to receive more services. However, theory also suggests that if the local government 
services are normal goods then their consumption should increase with the increase of 
resident’s income. These two factors are contradictory to each other since residents’ with 
higher income are more likely to be homeowners as well. Due to time restraints of the 
research these factors were not included in the study thus may be causing omitted 
variable bias. 
 Theory on local government expenditures and several previous studies indicated 
that coefficient for Commission Size would bear a positive sign. However, it was 
negative in all three datasets, which could be due to presence of endogeneity. This could 
possibly be remedied by utilizing two stage least square regression.  
The study also did not look at the revenue side of the various government 
structures. It is possible that part of the expenditures could be explained by the revenue 
different structures are able to obtain. The professional training of managers could allow 
them to be more successful in securing various grants compared to Commission and 
Commission-mayor. Further research in this area would most likely shed light on overall 
fiscal behavior of county governments.    
Conclusion 
This research inquired into whether government structure has any influence on 
expenditure. On the national sample of U.S. county governments several hypotheses were 
tested. The findings suggest that government structure does have an impact on agencies’ 
expenditure levels. Specifically, findings indicate that traditional Commission structure 
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tends to spend the least, followed by Commission-mayor and the most expensive being 
Commission-manager. For 2007 dataset Commission-manager increased the expenditure 
by over 35% while Commission-mayor increased it by nearly 13% versus traditional 
Commission structure. In addition, the study found, that the sample of counties analyzed 
had the capacity of existing services to absorb about 5% increase in their population, 
without increasing their expenditure. As for exogenous funding the study did find that it 
has stimulative effect on local government expenditure, however the magnitude was 
smaller than expected. In fact, the allowance of direct citizen influence elements on 
county level, specifically Recall, Petition/protest referendum and Combination of several 
is increasing government expenditure in respect to Initiative more than exogenous 
funding.     
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Appendix 
Part A: Tables 
Table 1: Variable Definitions
2
  
Expenditure Total county expenditure per person in 
$1,000s minus payment on interest. 
Commission Each commissioner serves as director of 
one or more functional departments (e.g. 
Public Works Director or Director of Health 
and Human Services) in addition to his/her 
policymaking role. The presiding officer 
may be chosen among the commissioners 
or elected directly.  
Commission-administrator  An elected commission sets policy, adopts 
legislation and approves the budget. The 
commission appoints an administration to 
conduct the day-to-day country business, to 
prepare the budget, to oversee department 
heads, and to recommend policy to the 
board.  
Commission-manager (2002 and 2007) An elected commission sets policy, adopts 
legislation and approves budget. The 
commission appoints a manager with broad 
executive authority to oversee and manage 
county departments, hire and fire most 
department directors, hire and fire county 
staff, prepare the budget, and recommend 
policy to the board.  
Commission-mayor  The elected commission is responsible for 
making policy. The executive elected at-
large implements county board policies, 
prepares the budget, and acts as county 
spokesperson. The executive often has veto 
power, which can be overridden. The form 
separates the legislative and executive 
powers.  
Intergovernmental revenue   A sum of federal and state funds received 
for various areas such as education, general 
government support, health and hospitals, 
highways, transit subsidies, housing and 
community development and public 
welfare.  
                                                          
2
 Definitions presented in the table were obtained from the ICMA County Form of Government 
questioner.  
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Veto power Whether the presiding officer 
(manager/administrator) has the authority to 
veto legislative and other acts passed by the 
commission  
Elected at large Members of the commission are elected 
county wide.  
Elected by ward/district County is divided into districts from which 
members of the commission are elected. 
Combined elections Counties are usually territorially divided 
where at-large or ward elections are used in 
order to elect commissioners.   
Initiative  Permits citizens to place charter, 
ordinances, or home rule changes directly 
on a ballot for approval or disapproval by 
the voters 
Binding referendum (1997) Allows voters to determine the outcome on 
public issues by binding the governing 
body to act on voters’ opinions. 
Non-binding referendum (1997) Allows voter to express an opinion on a 
specific topic without binding the 
governing body to act on voters’ opinions. 
Recall  A vote by the citizens to remove an elected 
official from office before the expiration of 
that official’s term.  
Petition/protest referendum (1997) Allows voters to delay enactment of local 
ordinances or by law until a referendum is 
held.  
Legislative referendum (2002 and 2007) Allows the commission to place any 
question on the ballot for voter approval or 
rejection. The result may be binding or non-
binding 
Popular referendum (2002 and 2007) Allows voters to collect signatures on a 
petition to place on the ballot any charter, 
ordinance, or home rule change that has 
been adopted by the local government 
before the change can take effect.  
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Table 2: Regression Results 
 
1997 2002 2007 
 
Coefficie
nt 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficie
nt 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficie
nt 
Standard 
Error 
Population  0.4511* 0.02591 0.4995* 0.0250 0.5356* 0.0207 
Commission-
administrator  
0.2390* 0.0629 0.0733 0.0579 0.1963* 0.0495 
Commission-manager N/A N/A 0.1911* 0.0670 0.3540* 0.0599 
Commission-mayor -0.0692 0.0735 0.1731** 0.0869 0.1287** 0.0654 
Intergovernmental 
revenue 
0.4681* 0.0215 0.4278* 0.0210 0.3813* 0.0154 
Veto power 0.0834 0.1019 0.1439 0.1064 0.0023 0.0869 
Commission size -0.0047 0.045 -0.0049 0.0039 -0.0023 0.0037 
Elected at large -0.0552 0.0586 0.0156 0.0541 0.0335 0.0472 
Combined elections 0.2139* 0.0775 0.1738** 0.0867 0.0062 0.0597 
Binding referendum 0.1640 0.1407 0.1672 0.1718 N/A N/A 
Legislative referendum N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.1779 0.1087 
Popular referendum 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
0.2000**
* 
0.1153 
Non-binding 
referendum 
0.0810 0.1293 0.2197 0.1659 N/A N/A 
Recall 0.0828 0.1240 0.3355** 0.1728 0.3985* 0.1191 
Petition/protest 
referendum 
0.0362 0.1301 
0.2822**
* 
0.1610 N/A N/A 
Combination of several 0.1725 0.1160 0.4297* 0.1546 0.2893* 0.1020 
N 472  459  783  
R-squared 0.9090  0.9039  0.8896  
Adjusted R-squared 0.9064  0.9009  0.8878  
*: p-value is 1% or less 
**: p-value is 5% or less 
***: p-value is 10% or less  
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Part B: Plots 
1997 Dataset 
Plot 1B: An augmented component- plus-residuals (augmented partial residual) plot 
for Commision size (independent variable)  
 
 Plot 2B: An augmented component- plus-residuals (augmented partial residual) 
plot for Population (untransformed independent variable) 
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Plot 3B: An augmented component-plus-residuals (augmented partial residual) plot 
for Population (transformed independent variable) 
 
Plot 4B: An augmented component plus residuals (augmented partial residual) plot 
for Intergovernment revenue (untransformed independent variable) 
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Plot 5B: An augmented component plus residuals (augmented partial residual) plot 
for Intergovernment revenue (transformed independent variable) 
 
Plot 6B: Residuals vs. Fitted values (untransformed dependent and independent 
variables) Heteroscedasticity 
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Plot 7B: Residuals vs. Fitted values (transformed dependent and independent 
variables) 
   
Plot 8B: Kernel density estimate: Density vs. Residuals (untransformed)  
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Plot 10B: Kernel density estimate: Density vs. Residuals (transformed) 
 
Plot 11B: Normal probability plot (untransformed) 
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Plot 12B: Normal probability plot (transformed) 
 
Plot 13B: Q-Q Plot (untransformed) 
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Plot 14B: Q-Q Plot (transformed) 
 
2002 Dataset 
Plot 15B: An augmented component- plus-residuals (augmented partial residual) 
plot for Commision size 
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Plot 15B: An augmented component- plus-residuals (augmented partial residual) 
plot for Population (untransformed independent variable) 
 
Plot 16B: An augmented component-plus-residuals (augmented partial residual) 
plot for Population (transformed independent variable) 
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Plot 17B: An augmented component plus residuals (augmented partial residual) plot 
for Intergovernment revenue (untransformed independent variable) 
 
Plot 18B: An augmented component plus residuals (augmented partial residual) plot 
for Intergovernment revenue (transformed independent variable) 
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Plot 19B: Residuals vs. Fitted values (untransformed dependent and independent 
variables) Heteroscedasticity 
 
Plot 20B: Residuals vs. Fitted values (transformed dependent and independent 
variables) 
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Plot 21B: Kernel density estimate: Density vs. Residuals (untransformed)  
 
Plot 22B: Kernel density estimate: Density vs. Residuals (transformed) 
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Plot 23B: Normal probability plot (untransformed) 
 
Plot 24B: Normal probability plot (transformed) 
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Plot 25B: Q-Q Plot (untransformed) 
 
 
Plot 26B: Q-Q Plot (transformed) 
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2007 Dataset 
Plot 27B: An augmented component- plus-residuals (augmented partial residual) 
plot for Commision size  
 
 Plot 28B: An augmented component- plus-residuals (augmented partial residual) 
plot for Population (untransformed independent variable) 
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Plot 29B: An augmented component-plus-residuals (augmented partial residual) 
plot for Population (transformed independent variable) 
 
Plot 30B: An augmented component plus residuals (augmented partial residual) plot 
for Intergovernment revenue (untransformed independent variable) 
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Plot 31B: An augmented component plus residuals (augmented partial residual) plot 
for Intergovernment revenue (transformed independent variable) 
 
Plot 32B: Residuals vs. Fitted values (untransformed dependent and independent 
variables) Heteroscedasticity 
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Plot 33B: Residuals vs. Fitted values (transformed dependent and independent 
variables) 
   
Plot 34B: Kernel density estimate: Density vs. Residuals (untransformed)  
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Plot 35B: Kernel density estimate: Density vs. Residuals (transformed) 
 
Plot 36B: Normal probability plot (untransformed) 
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Plot 37B: Normal probability plot (transformed) 
 
Plot 38B: Q-Q Plot (untransformed) 
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Plot 39B: Q-Q Plot (transformed) 
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